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ABSTRACT 
The recent death of a Volkswagen worker at the hand of a factory 
robot has resulted in a number of editorials and opinion pieces 
discussing moral responsibility and robots.  In this short response 
piece we outline some of the wider context of this discussion, 
with reference to the classic ethical study the Case of the Killer 
Robot.  We argue that there is a growing need for the field of 
computer ethics to consider with some urgency what it means to 
be a responsible moral agent when tragic events occur, and to 
what extent it makes sense to ‘blame the robot’. 
Categories and Subject Descriptors 
K.7.4 [Professional Ethics]: Codes of ethics; Codes of good 
practice; Ethical dilemmas. 
General Terms 
Security; Human Factors; Legal Aspects 
Keywords 
Ethics; Morality; Professional Issues; Killer Robot; Case of the 
Killer Robot; Volkswagen 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The question of who we should blame when a robot kills a human 
has recently become somewhat more pressing.  The recent death 
of a Volkswagen employee at the hand of an industrial factory 
robot [1] has left ethicists and legislators unsure of where the 
moral and ethical responsibility for the death should lie – does it 
lie with the owners, the developers, the factory managers, or 
elsewhere?  These are not easy questions – for many years, the 
authors of this paper have used the Case of the Killer Robot study 
[3] to explore issues of moral and ethical responsibility within 
classes on computer ethics and professionalism.  The Killer Robot 
case study begins with the CX30 robot malfunctioning and killing 
its operator.  It then progresses through the use of fictionalized 
newspaper articles.  Each of these successively unpick and expand 
upon the facts as we know them to help illustrate the complex 
interrelated issues of responsibility in collaborative software 
development.  As a teaching scenario, it is now showing its age, 
which resulted in the authors publishing their own ethical case 
study [7][8] as a spiritual successor.  However, the issues that the 
Case of the Killer Robot raises are highly relevant to the recent 
unfortunate events in Baunatal, Germany.   
Details about the incident are limited at the time of writing as an 
investigation is still ongoing.  We know that the twenty-two year 
old victim was part of the team setting up a stationary robot at the 
factory.  It activated, grabbed him, and crushed him against one of 
the metal plates that formed part of its rig.  Volkswagen claim 
human error – the robot was functioning as expected, it was just 
that it shouldn’t have been active while anyone was within its 
safety rig.  However, until such a conclusion is delivered from a 
party not directly involved in the tragic events, we would like to 
take the opportunity to discuss the issue from the perspective of a 
malfunctioning piece of automated hardware.  Within this paper 
we will use the term ‘robot’ and ‘automation’ largely 
interchangeably, representing an acknowledgement of the fact that 
‘robots’ often do not take on the forms that we might expect from 
popular literature.  The ethical issues are the same, in our view, 
whether we are talking about software or physical hardware. 
2. Where Does Responsibility Lie? 
Failures in industrial software engineering projects are multi-
faceted and rarely can we point to a single individual in a large 
team as the sole originator of faulty programming or iffy 
hardware.  Software is not just the product of the developers - it is 
also a product of wider societal norms, management paradigms, 
and cultural expectations.  Software development is also hugely 
collaborative, and builds upon the work of others through layers 
of architectural abstraction – toolkits; frameworks; virtual 
machines; programming languages; and operating contexts.  The 
executing code of a programmer is usually mediated through 
many software and hardware modules before it is eventually 
enacted upon by the underlying systems.  When software is 
embedded within hardware, such as is often the case with robots, 
there may be many fewer layers.  This doesn’t greatly simplify the 
task of assigning responsibility for malfunctions.  The context of 
software development is complex, and while fewer layers mean 
fewer mediations and abstractions, we can rarely point to a single 
code point and say ‘That’s the culprit’. 
When a robot malfunctions and grabs an employee, which part of 
the software systems malfunctioned?    One can realistically place 
the blame at almost any layer – adherents of the philosophy of 
defensive programming would argue that ‘all data is tainted 
unless proven otherwise’.  Every step of the system should be re-
evaluating the instructions it was given to ensure that they make 
sense in context.  It could be argued that it was the blame of the 
quality assurance department, as they should have caught errors 
before they ever made it into production code.  It could be argued 
that it was a management issue, because management put in place 
the protocols through which the software could be marked off as 
complete.  You could argue it was the fault of the factory owners 
for accepting delivery of a machine they had not tested for safety.  
You could argue a meaningful role for almost anyone – indeed, 
that is the real lesson that can be learned from the Case of the 
Killer Robot.  However, such blame games are unhelpful and in 
many respects just obscure the core issue – that we don’t have a 
meaningful framework within which we can assess collaborative 
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responsibility in cutting edge software and hardware engineering.  
Often, we must simply conclude that nobody is to blame because 
everybody is to blame.  That might be the truth, but it’s a very 
unsatisfying truth.  It offers no catharsis, and affords no closure. 
What’s more interesting perhaps in the Volkswagen incident is 
that we seem now to be willing to accept that the robot itself may 
have to shoulder some of the blame.  When we teach the Case of 
the Killer Robot to our students, perhaps the most notable thing is 
that nobody ever considers the robot to be the real villain in the 
piece.  I have heard students put a case for why the plagiarizing 
programmer or the bullying bosses or the browbeaten tester 
should bear the largest brunt of responsibility.  Nobody has ever 
asked ‘why is the robot getting a free pass?’  We teach the case 
study with computing students so a certain degree of 
understanding of how hardware and software interacts likely has 
an impact on this moral judgement.   For others though, where the 
underlying relationship between developers and software and 
hardware are obscured in essential unknowability, should the 
robot actually be a valid target for judgement? 
3. Unknowable Machines 
More and more, we’re willing to accept that our computing and 
hardware devices should take some responsibility for their own 
wellbeing.  We have software packages that can mend their own 
installations, and antivirus software that patrols our systems, often 
with minimal input from the operator.   We have operating 
systems that keep up to date, invisibly re-engineering themselves 
as we use them.   
Once upon a time when you pressed the ‘eject’ button on a video 
player, it obeyed instantly – video cassettes would be spat out in 
an instant, sometimes trailing ribbons of unwound tape behind 
them.  Now, you’re as likely to see a little hourglass wheeling as 
the device ‘thinks’ about whether or not to obey our instruction.  
We’ve gone from issuing commands to making suggestions, and 
we are sometimes over-ruled when the software decides that we 
need saved from ourselves.  When I tell my Macbook to shut 
down, it usually tells me that it won’t until I go and manually shut 
down all my running programs.  The OS in such cases decides 
that it knows best.  Perhaps it does, but in such circumstances we 
have to consider whether we as the users are actually in control.  
If we are not in control, then we need to consider how much 
responsibility we bear for our actions. 
This moves the argument for ethical responsibility onto the 
developers, but this too is increasingly an area where it is the 
software that makes the decisions.  Some software is now so 
complex that developers cannot say with any real confidence how 
it makes decisions.  Advanced neural nets make so many 
connections, at such speed, and using such vast data-sets that no-
one can be entirely sure how they arrive at their conclusions.  
Google’s ‘deep learning’ machines are now so advanced that they 
sometimes outwit their own programmers [9].  The likely outcome 
of this is that such deep learning machines may need to be 
maintained by other, specialist, deep learning machines.   This 
means fewer experts writing and developing the tools, and more 
layers of abstraction between their work and the eventual output 
of the systems.  In other words, we are losing the ability at the 
bleeding edge of development to meaningfully understand why 
our software does what it does. 
These trends may be alarming, but we must also consider the 
benefits that come from such automation.  Google’s self-driving 
cars, for example, have been involved in numerous collisions.  
The evidence though suggests that it has never been through an 
error on the part of the self-driving algorithms - it’s always been 
‘other drivers’ [5].  Whether this is true or not, we must accept the 
possibility that automation, when done well, simply makes fewer 
mistakes than humans in the same situations.  Under the limited 
circumstances under which an AI platform may thrive, they think 
faster, think more broadly, and think more reliably.  One paper [2] 
breaks down legal judgements to determine extraneous factors 
that might influence rulings – proximity to a lunch break, amongst 
other things, is a genuine influencing factor on the severity of a 
the sentence that a judge hands down.  We overestimate, in many 
cases, our own rationality.  Likewise we underestimate the degree 
to which factors over which we are not fully in control may 
influence our decisions.   
On the other hand, barring a few vanishingly small incidents, for 
example the notorious Pentium FDIV bug [12], Computers do not 
make mistakes. At least, they do not make them within the 
parameters of the designed hardware that we provide them.  It 
comes down again to the fallibility of software and hardware 
developers.  Increasingly that too is becoming an unsatisfying 
answer that lacks closure and catharsis. 
Ultimately, everything that a computer, or a robot, does ends back 
at the code a software developer writes: that would seem like a 
sensible termination point for where moral responsibility lies.  We 
too though are slaves to our own genetic and neural 
programming1 and yet we are an obvious unit of moral 
responsibility.  We cannot simply argue that what we do is an 
inevitable consequence of our evolutionary firmware.  That does 
not expunge us of the weight of immorality.  We bear the ultimate 
responsibility for what we do – why not computers? 
These issues are not simple to untangle.  The growing importance 
of automation and robotics to modern society puts pressure on us 
to come up with at least some kind of framework within which we 
can properly evaluate the moral responsibility of software and 
hardware development.  A recent letter, signed by Stephen 
Hawking, Elon Musk and Steve Wozniak amongst many others2 
argued for a ban on autonomous artificial intelligence in offensive 
warfare.  It will be technically feasible in the next few years for 
military drones to be deployed without the moderating hand of a 
human at the kill-switch.  The authors of this letter have argued in 
the strongest terms that we should never allow this to happen – 
that while AI can be used effectively in defensive systems, to 
allow its use in offensive roles is to spark off the next great arms 
race.  This is a valid concern, and one which we share.  However, 
we must also be mindful of the fact that drones are precise only 
when the information that is fed to their operators is similarly 
precise.  With a human ‘moral agent’ at the kill-switch the death 
count that comes from drone warfare is still alarming.  The human 
rights group Reprieve issued an analysis which suggested that 
from a targeting pool of 41 people, the US drone programme 
resulted in a death toll of 1,147 [13] – for every target, 28 
bystanders are killed.  The Hellfire missiles that rain down from 
Predator or Reaper drones are no respecter of precision, and so far 
we cannot say that having a human pull the trigger has led to 
1 And perhaps even unwilling to make any changes in what is an 
inherently deterministic universe, but let’s not go down that 
particular rabbit hole. 
2 The text and list of signatories for this letter may be found here:  
http://futureoflife.org/AI/open_letter_autonomous_weapons 
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inspiring results.   Drone operators work within formal systems of 
diffused responsibility.  They by themselves cannot bear the moral 
burden of such deaths in the same way that we cannot single out 
individual programmers within a development team.  It is hard 
though to see how much worse it could get with autonomous AI at 
the helm.  Critics may argue that AI cannot feel sympathy, 
empathy or remorse – but neither can it feel anger, impatience or 
hate.  The mistakes that automated AI might make are software 
errors, and those can be fixed – over time, a software system will 
tend towards (although probably never reach) zero defects.  The 
question in such cases is ‘what cost are we willing to accept for 
iterative improvements?’ In making that decision, we should not 
undervalue the fact that improvements can be made. 
In the early days of automated computer intelligence, we were at 
least partially saved from an escalating nuclear exchange by the 
cool head and moral compass of Colonel Stanislav Petrov [4], 
who interpreted incoming nuclear missile telemetry correctly as a 
malfunction in the Soviet early warning system.  Had this been 
entirely automated, we might well not be in a position now to 
debate the ethical and moral responsibility of robots.  However, 
we have come a long way since then and we need not be 
inherently fearful of the impact of automation.   That is not to say 
that we shouldn’t be wary.  Leaving aside the issues of technical 
correctness we don’t have the tools we need to meaningfully 
address the ethical dilemmas that arise from deaths that result 
from automation or faulty programming.  It is often the case that 
technology outstrips our philosophy and legislation, and this is an 
area in which the gulf between ‘what we can do’ and ‘how we 
understand what we do’ is very wide. 
4. Conclusion 
The death of the Volkswagen worker was tragic, but it must be 
viewed in context – in terms of significant robot related deaths, 
we have this and Therac-25 [11] as the major headline cases.  In 
the UK alone, there were an estimated 142 fatal workplace 
injuries in 2014/2015, and 136 in 2013/14 [6] - far more in one 
country, in one year, than we can realistically attribute within the 
workplace to failures of robotics.   When considered in context, 
the number of robot-related deaths is actually very small – 
perhaps even comfortingly so.  We do more damage to ourselves, 
as a species, than robots ever could.   
However, we do need to start the conversation properly as to what 
moral role we should assign robots when things go wrong.  At the 
moment, our frameworks for having that discussion are not well 
equipped to deal with the logistics of distributed authority in 
software development. We certainly don’t have an effective 
ethical architecture for assigning blame to semi-autonomous units 
that we have no ability to even punish for transgressions.  What 
can we realistically do to punish a robot that is deemed to have 
behaved outsides the bounds of societal norms?  We can punish 
the human web around it, but we cannot truly punish an entity that 
has no conscious awareness of its own self.   
Perhaps what we need is a kind of fuzzy ethics to go with the 
often fuzzy logic that underpins complex learning systems.  One 
that is capable of handling a multi-dimensional relational web of 
roles, and assessing moral responsibility through collapsing 
certain pathways of that web to create judgement perspectives 
based on what it is we’re looking to decide.  We don’t have that 
yet – we don’t even have anything close to it.  Until we do, 
arguments over blame and responsibility in these kinds of 
circumstances will always be shallow, failing to cut to the heart of 
the matter.   
In other words, we have a very long way to go before blaming 
automated systems is anything more than an irrational outcome of 
the anthropomorphizing of human frustrations. 
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